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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion; BURGERJN-THE-ROUND, a Delaware 
corporation, ANDREW W. SOUVALL, 
TOULA P. SOUVALL, his wife; PETER W. 
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Intervening Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
S. CRAIG HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
The statement of the nature of the case, the disposition 
in the lower court, and the relief sought on appeal have here-
tofore been set forth in appellant's brief, and are not, there-
fore, set forth herein. However, appellant does desire to clar-
ify some of the facts set forth in the brief of intervening plain-
tiff-respondent. In addition thereto, appellant desires to re-
spond to certain of the legal arguments raised in the brief of 
intervening plaintiff-respondent. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In its brief, intervening plaintiff-respondent has chal-
lenged appellant's version of the record as set forth in appel-
lant's Statement of Facts. As part of the challenge, Zions 
Case No. 
12686 
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First National Bank has prepared its own Statement of Facts 
and introduced much new material in its brief. Considerable 
time has elapsed and plaintiffs-respondents have failed to file 
a brief, apparently relying upon the brief filed by the Bank. 
In the interim, appellant has retained the law firm of Strong 
& Hanni, as associate counsel, for the purposes of filing this 
reply brief and presenting oral argument to this Honorable 
Court. It is not appellant's intention to restate the various 
facts and arguments which were set forth in his original brief. 
However, appellant recognizes the complexity of the facts 
involved in this case and deems it imperative to reply to inter-
vening plaintiffs-respondents within the limitations of Rule 
75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
To accomplish this purpose, appellant will stand upon 
the statement of the facts in his original brief. It is appellant's 
contention that the same represents a fair reading of the record 
and that they are adequately and fully documented. There are 
numerous statements in the Bank's brief which appellant con-
tends are incorrect and not supported in the record. They will 
be discussed under the various appropriate points of argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO DETER-
MINE WHETHER THE BANK WAS THE AGENT OF 
THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE GIVING OF INFORMA-
TION ABOUT UNIVERSAL LEASING TO THE DE-
FENDANT, AND FURTHER THAT A PRINCIPAL IS 
LIABLE FOR THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF ITS 
AGENT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THAT 
AGENCY. 
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Ihe Lower Court's refusal to allow the jury to consider 
the alleged agency relationship between Zions First National 
Bank and the plaintiffs was highly prejudicial and amounted 
to significant error. There was sufficient evidence to raise a 
jury question on appellant's theory of agency, but the Court 
ignored such evidence in its instructions to the jury and in the 
manner in which it submitted the case on special interroga-
tories. The instructions and interrogatories treated the parties 
as completely separate and had the effect of telling the jury 
that there was nothing unusual about this banking transaction 
This attitude of the Court was manifested early in the pro-
ceedings in the highly restrictive rulings on the admissibility 
of evidence. Appellant was prevented from presenting con-
siderable additional evidence which was probative on the is-
sue of agency and other material relationships of the plaintiffs 
and the Bank officers. (See point II of this brief). The net 
effect of the Court's rulings and instructions was that the jury 
had to consider the plaintiffs and the Bank as standing only 
in the relationship of debtor and creditor and that one was 
not responsible for the acts of the other. Also, the jury was 
forced to view the acts of omissions of either as independent 
from the acts or omissions of the other. As a result, appellant 
was effectively denied the right to present the heart of his case 
to the jury. The issue of agency was properly raised in the 
pleadings by appellant, there was evidence to support the same, 
and the defendant requested an instruction on agency. As 
stated on page 22 of the Bank's brief, it is the duty of the 
Court to present the theories of both parties to the jury. This 
the Court failed to do. 
The Bank has misunderstood and misstated Mr. Hunter's 
position on the question of agency as contained in his brief. 
3 
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On Page 8 of its brief, the Bank interprets the appellant's 
position in the following manner: 
". . . Defendant argues that Zions First National 
Bank, intervening plaintiff in this action, became the 
agent of the plaintiffs for the sale of a security under 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 6-1-22 (1) (b) (1953), 
because it required express consent of the stockowner 
before releasing any information about the stock in 
question." 
Such is not the position of Mr. Hunter and no such argument 
is contained in his brief. 
It is Mr. Hunter's position that the Bank became the 
agent for the plaintiffs for the specific purpose of providing 
appellant with the information on the stock of Universal Leas-
ing Company and in that capacity, liability could be found 
against both the Bank and the plaintiffs under the cited Utah 
law. It is not contended that the Bank became the agent be-
cause it required the consent of the plaintiffs before giving 
such information, but rather that it became the agent when 
the plaintiffs directed it to give the information to the de-
fendant and vested in it the corresponding authority to act 
and it so acted. 
Appellant has no real quarrel with the general conclu-
sions of the legal authorities cited on the issue of agency in 
the Bank's brief, although they certainly are not a full recita-
tion of the law of agency. It is appellant's contention that 
these authorities are consistent with his position and that the 
question of agency should have been submitted to the jury. 
While consent of the parties is necessary to the creation of an 
4 
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agency relationship, such consent may be expressed or implied. 
Thus, we see in 2A C.J.S., Agency, Section 52, the following 
language: 
"The relation of agency need not depend upon ex-
press appointment and acceptance thereof, but may 
be, and frequently is, implied from the words and con-
duct of the parties and the circumstances of the par-
ticular case. The law creates a relationship of princi-
pal and agent if the parties, in the conduct of their af-
fairs actually place themselves in such a position as 
requires the relationship to be inferred by the courts, 
and if, from the facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case, it appears that there was at least an implied 
intention to create it, the relation may be held to exist, 
notwithstanding a denial by the alleged principal, and 
whether or not the parties understood it to be an 
agency." 
In the case of Presta v. Monmer, 146 A.2d 404, 145 
Conn. 69A, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a 
vendor of an apartment building who referred a purchaser 
to a woman to answer purchaser's questions as to certain 
material facts made the woman his agent for the purpose of 
answering the specific questions. This is closely analogous to 
what the plaintiffs and Bank did. The evidence shows that 
when Mr. Hunter contacted Mr. Peter Souvall, one of the 
plaintiffs, regarding the possible purchase of Universal Leas-
ing Company's securities, Mr. Souvall agreed that they wanted 
to sell the stock, but informed Mr. Hunter that it was being 
held by the Bank as collateral on a loan and that he would 
have to go there to get the information he was seeking con-
cerning the stock (R 43, 44, 47, 396, 397). Mr. Souvall told 
Mr. Donald Bennett, one of the officers of the Bank, to give 
Mr. Hunter whatever information about the stock the Bank had 
5 
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(R 183). Mr. Hunter went to the Bank for said information 
and consulted about the stock with Mr. Bennett and also Mr. 
John Langeland, Senior Vice-President of the Bank (R 183, 
396,397). 
While there is conflict in the evidence as to the informa-
tion received by Mr. Hunter, the proper resolution of this 
conflict was for the jury. There is no question that Mr. Hun-
ter went to the Bank for the purpose of getting whatever fi-
nancial information the Bank had on the stock. He was sent 
there by the sellers of the stock and it is incredible that the 
Bank now takes the position that its role in the entire trans-
action was immaterial to the culminated sale. Mr. Souvall 
and the other plaintiffs knew the Bank had information to 
give Mr. Hunter and they relied upon the Bank to do so. 
This placed upon the Bank the duty to give accurate informa-
tion to the appellant and to make full disclosure of all the 
information it had. Whether or not the Bank complied with 
this duty is a question which the jury should have decided. 
There was sufficient evidence introduced in the lower court 
to show that the Bank played a material role in the sale and 
to submit the question of "whether or not the Bank violated 
the Statute" to the jury. That evidence is discussed under 
Point VI of this brief. It is reasonable to conclude that a fair 
minded jury would find that the plaintiff directed and the 
Bank consented to act as an agent for the purpose of giving 
financial information to Mr. Hunter. It is also reasonable to 
assume that in giving such a direction, plaintiffs retained a 
certain amount of control over the Bank in this limited agency 
relationship. Had the plaintiffs changed their minds and di-
rected the Bank not to give any such information to Mr. Hun-
6 
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ter, the Bank would have followed such a direction which is 
evidence that it was subjecting itself to the control of plaintiffs. 
It only acted upon the authority vested in it by the plaintiffs. 
The failure of the Court to submit this issue to the jury 
deprived appellant of the basic part of his statutory defense 
and counterclaim against both the plaintiffs and the Bank. It 
is appellant's contention that the plaintiffs should be charged 
not only for their own material omissions, but also for the mis-
representations and material omissions of the Bank. It is also 
Mr. Hunter's position that the Bank is primarily liable under 
Section 6 l - l -22 ( l ) (b ) as an agent who materially aided in 
the sale of the security. 
The Bank has responded on Pages 13 and 14 of its brief 
by saying, "Under any theory, the jury's decision would have 
foreclosed the judgment in defendant's favor." The Bank bases 
its conclusion upon the answers the jury gave to Interrogatories 
11 through 14. These interrogatories were submitted on the 
question of the commission of common law fraud by the Bank. 
They were submitted under the qualifying instruction that 
Hunter had the burden of proving the issues answered therein 
by clear and convincing evidence. As pointed out in appel-
lant's brief, the elements of statutory fraud and common law 
fraud and the burden of proof in each is different and it can-
not be said that the jury ever considered the elements of stat-
utory fraud as k related to the Bank in its individual or agency 
capacity. In addition to this, as will be seen in Point II of 
the brief, the Court's erroneous rulings excluding material 
evidence prevented the jury from properly considering the 
elements of Mr. Hunter's common law defense against the 
7 
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Bank and the Souvalls. Other errors of the court considered 
under this Point and in Points II, III and IV will show that 
the court made it impossible for the jury to properly try the 
issues in appellant's statutory defense against the Souvalls. 
Therefore, contrary to the position of the Bank, under no 
theory were the issues properly directed to or considered by 
the jury. Further discussion on this matter and also the right 
of appellant to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
will be discussed hereafter. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COM-
MITTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN EXCLUDING 
FROM THE EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS PROPOSED EX-
HIBIT 7-D, ENTITLED "SBA LOAN APPLICATION." 
The Respondent-Bank argues that proposed Exhibit 7-D 
was irrelevant and immaterial and was not probative of any 
fact in issue and therefore, the court properly excluded it 
from evidence. The Respondent further argued that there was 
nothing improper about the SBA loan. In order to support 
those points, the Bank made numerous misstatements of fact 
that are not supported by the record and incorrectly stated the 
Defendant's arguments as to its admissibility. 
The facts show that the SBA loan application (proposed 
Exhibit 7-D is the application that included the Universal 
Leasing stock as part of the loan collateral) was prepared in 
August of 1969 and not in June as contended by the Bank 
(R35-36). John Langeland and Donald Bennett of the Bank 
assisted Pete Souvall in the preparation of the Loan applica-
tion (R-88). At the time, John Langeland and T. Bowering 
Woodbury, a Vice-President of the Bank, were both officers, 
8 
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members of the Board of Directors, and members of the Ex-
ecutive Committees of both borrowing corporations (R-28, 
80-83). For these and other reasons, the Bank was charged 
with knowledge of the contents of the SBA loan application. 
It formed the basis upon which the loan to the plaintiffs was 
ultimately made. The appellant's agreement to purchase the 
securities of Universal Leasing Company was the culmination 
of a series of transactions that started with the SBA loan. It is 
the appellant's position that these transactions cannot be iso-
lated from one another as the Bank contends. The defendant-
appellant will point out how those transactions, beginning with 
the joint participation of the plaintiffs and Bank officers in 
the fraudulent procurement of the SBA loan, became a sig-
nificant part of the circumstances that led up to and surrounded 
their sale of certain items of the loan collateral to Hunter. 
To begin with, the Bank incorrectly stated in its brief 
that it is not contended that there was anything illegal or im-
proper about the SBA loan. Apparently, the Bank has chosen 
to ignore Pages 14 through 16 of the appellant's brief. The 
loan was granted on the basis of numerous misstatements and 
omissions that were jointly made by the plaintiff and the Bank 
in the application R-28, 80, 83-84, 88, 144-145, 148 Ex. 
7-D. It is contended that those misstatements and omissions 
in the application were of such a gross nature as to possibly 
subject the preparers thereof to the criminal sanctions of 15 
15 U.S.C, 645 which makes it unlawful to prepare and pre-
sent a false loan application to the Small Business Administra-
tion. 
9 
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Following their fraudulent procurement and use of the 
SBA loan, the plaintiff corporations made only one monthly 
payment of $4,798.00 and went into bankruptcy R-92, 219. 
The joint participation of the plaintiffs and Bank officers in 
the above described activities left them with substantial mutual 
problems to solve. The Bank Officers were deeply concerned 
that their prior involvement in illegal activities might be un-
covered and create other severe problems for them. They were 
aware that the values of the assets, as shown in the SBA appli-
cation, were grossly overstated. Their analysis of Universal 
Leasing to determine if it was worthy of credit revealed that 
the only way that Universal Leasing would qualify for financ-
ing was strictly on the strength of the lessee. That fact, along 
with their awareness of the effect that Dinner Table's going 
broke would have on Universal Leasing, gave them knowledge 
that Universal Leasing was in serious financial trouble. They 
were also aware that some of the other assets were improp-
erly valued, including some of the leases that they had pledged 
on the SBA loan that were very delinquent when the applica-
tion was submitted. Souvalls were also concerned about those 
problems and that they might lose their homes if a solution 
couldn't be found. 
When Hunter appeared on the scene inquiring about 
Universal Leasing stock, the plaintiffs and Bank officers de-
vised a plan whereby Hunter would become the solution to 
their problems. The plan provided the way for Souvalls to 
get back their homes and have their loan paid back to Zions 
and the SBA with funds derived from the sale of the Highland 
Drive property and the worthless Universal Leasing stock. The 
success of the plan required material misstatements and omis-
sions on the part of the Bank officers as well as the Souvalls. 
10 
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The willingness of the Bank Officers to make misstate-
ments and material omissions to solve problems which would 
mutually benefit the plaintiffs and themselves and to make 
further misstatements and omissions to prevent those prior 
illegal activities from coming to light is amply demonstrated 
by their inconsistent and conflicting testimonies concerning 
their knowledge of and participation in the SBA loan. It is 
the defendant-appellant's contention that the loan application 
and related testimony should have been admitted as evidence 
and that he should have been able to use the application in 
impeaching their testimonies. In addition to that, it is sub-
mitted that the appellant should have been allowed to de-
velop further evidence about their true participation in the 
activities involving the SBA loan. Some of the irregularities 
of the SBA loan and examples of their related conflicting testi-
monies are discussed below and should have been admitted as 
circumstances of the Bank Officers that had a bearing on their 
credibility as witnesses. 
1. The failure to set forth in ITEM 2 of "Appellant's 
Statement" of the SBA loan application, the fact that both 
Langeland and Bennett of the Bank assisted in the prepara-
tion of the loan application R88. Pete Souvall testified 
that both Bennett and Langeland assisted him in filling out 
that application R88. Langeland testified in his deposition 
that Bennett assisted Souvall but in court said that the Bank 
can't assist in filling out an application to the SBA p. 19 of 
deposition R220-221. In court, both Langeland and Bennett 
denied that they assisted in the preparation of the SBA loan 
application R 220-221, 144. 
11 
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2. The failure to disclose in ITEM 3 the fact that Mr. 
T. Bowering Woodbury and Mr. John Langeland of the Bank 
were officers, directors and members of the Executive Com-
mittees of both borrowing corporations R 28, 80, 83-84, 
143-145. Bennett testified in his deposition that he was 
aware of only one relationship that Langeland had with Dinner 
Table. He testified that Langeland was a small stockholder 
of Dinner Table and that fact was shown in the SBA loan ap-
plication, p. 8 of deposition. That fact was not shown in 
the application Exhibit 7-D. In court, Bennett further con-
tradicted his deposition and testified that he was aware that 
Langeland was a director of Dinner Table when the loan was 
made R 143. He couldn't explain why that wasn't shown 
in the application R 144-6. 
The responding Bank has incorrectly cited portions of 
the testimony of Mr. Peter Souvall as evidence for the state-
ment in their brief that the Bank admits that certain of its 
officers were also officers of the borrowing corporations at 
the time they procurred the SBA loan p. 16 of their brief. 
However, the testimony of the Bank officers at the trial con-
tradicted Pete Souvall's testimony. Langeland, Senior Vice-
President of the Bank, emphatically denied being an officer 
or on the Executive Committee of either Dinner Table or 
S & F Supply Company, or being a director of S & F R 220. 
It is appellant's contention that the Bank officers were 
very concerned about their heavy involvement in irregular and 
illegal banking practices and attempted to convey the impres-
sion to the court that their only interests and motives in see-
ing the stock sold were those of a bankers. The only relation-
12 
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ship besides debtor-creditor that Langeland admitted to was 
being a reluctant director of Dinner Table R 220-222. 
3. The failure to disclose the actual use of the loan pro-
ceeds in ITEM 8 or in Exhibit B of the application R 148. 
Exhibit 7-D shows that in excess of $175,000.00 of the $200,-
000.00 loan proceeds were to be used as working capital Ex. 
7-D item 6. Bennett admitted that $73,000.00 of the loan 
proceeds went to pay off other unrelated loans at Zions Bank 
which loans were personally guaranteed by the Souvalls 
R 147, 148. Bennett admitted that this was not revealed 
to the SBA in the loan application R 148. This was con-
trary to his deposition in which he testified that the use of 
those proceeds were shown in the SBA loan application p. 7 
deposition. Langeland's testimony in his deposition was in-
consistent on the use of proceeds as well p. 11, 16-18 deposi-
tion. When the appellant attempted to go further to show 
that the balance of the loan proceeds were also misused for 
their mutual benefit, the matter was objected to by counsel 
for the plaintiffs and the Court sustained the objection and 
in effect ruled that the use of the loan proceeds was not ma-
terial to the issues of the present case R 149-151. 
4. The improper evaluation of the assets which were 
pledged as collateral on the loan. The Bank used Swenson's 
offer to place a value of $100,000.00 on the stock to procure 
the SBA loan R 159, 167, 186. Souvall testified that the 
Universal Leasing stock was a material consideration in the 
SBA approving the loan R 36. The plaintiffs and the Bank 
officers stated that the only information that was significant 
at any time, in their assessment of the value of the Universal 
13 
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Leasing stock, was Swenson's offer. Both the plaintiffs and 
Bank officers testified that it was a valid offer and would have 
been valid even at the time the stock was sold to Hunter. If 
it was valid, it was much better than Hunters offer, since 
Swenson's offer was for $100,000.00 for the stock and they 
had Psarras' offer of $35,000.00 for some of the other items. 
Therefore, they would have had $135,000.00 and still have 
the restaurant inventory to sell R 199-200. Yet, no one 
ever approached Mr. Swenson about accepting his offer even 
though the evidence showed: (1) they had contact with Mr. 
Swenson at times when the loan was in default and the col-
lateral was for sale R 187, 200-202, 208-209, 226, 229, 
250; and (2) if the Swenson offer was valid, it would have 
been a much more lucrative offer than given by Mr. Hunter 
R 199. 
The truth of the matter is that because of their involve-
ments with the plaintiff corporations, they were aware that 
Universal Leasing was in serious financial trouble. They were 
also aware that Mr. Swenson was an officer, director, sizable 
stockholder and on the payroll of Universal Leasing and was, 
therefore, very much aware of the financial problems of Uni-
versal R 208, 605-609, 617-618. This explains the reason 
that they never attempted to sell the stock to Mr. Swenson. 
The Bank contended in its brief that the court properly 
excluded proposed Exhibit 7-D from evidence because it was 
not probative of any fact in issue. The defendant-appellant 
maintains that the admission of proposed Exhibit 7-D was ab-
solutely essential to allow the jury to properly consider num-
erous disputed facts and issues that were material to his de-
fense of fraud. 
14 
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The SBA application and related testimonies were ma-
terial to numerous disputed facts and issues including the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Relationships between Plaintiffs and Bank Officers. 
One of those facts in dispute is "what were the true relation-
ships that existed between the plaintiffs and Bank officers that 
motivated their actions in the sale of assets to Hunter." It is 
the defendant-appellant's contention that Exhibit 7-D should 
have been admitted to establish those relationships since they 
were far different than the debtor-creditor relationship claimed 
and gave rise to motivations and knowledge far different from 
what would be expected from a normal debtor-creditor, i.e., 
banker-client, relationship. The loan application, combined 
with the limited inquires that the defendant was able to make, 
established their relationship to be one of joint participants in 
illegal and fraudulent activities in their procurement and use 
of the SBA loan and were heavily involved in the affairs of 
the borrowing corporations. That relationship left them with 
substantial mutual problems to solve and the plaintiffs and 
Bank officers worked together to solve those problems in the 
fraudulent sale to Mr. Hunter. Their willingness to solve 
those problems by means of material misstatements and omis-
sions is demonstrated by their material misstatements and 
omissions in the SBA loan application and further misstate-
ments and omissions in their depositons and testimonies in 
the trial. 
(2) Scienter. The fact is that the borrowing corporation 
had substantial intervening business relationships and adverse 
financial dealings with Universal Leasing. It will be shown 
under Point III of this brief that those relationships and 
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dealings were the major factor that caused Universal Leasing 
to go broke. Therefore, the extent to which the Bank officers 
were involved with the borrowing corporations in relation-
ships other than debtor-creditor, is significant in establishing 
their knowledge of said dealings. 
(3) Agency. The relationship discussed above provided ad-
ditional reasons why the plaintiffs might use, and have, the 
cooperation of the Bank officers in providing information on 
the Universal Leasing stock to Hunter. 
(4) Intentional misstatements and omissions. In the plead-
ings, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiffs and Bank of-
ficers worked together in a plan to defraud him. It was nec-
essary for the jury to understand the relationships, involve-
ments and mutual problems of the plaintiffs and Bank offi-
cers in order to understand the circumstances that motivated 
their actions in their fraudulent sale to Hunter. 
This is not merely a breach of contract action, but in-
volves serious allegations of mutual participation in fraudu-
lent practices. It is a well accepted rule of law that great lat-
itude is permitted in the introduction of evidence in cases in-
volving fraud 37 CJ.S. Fraud, Section 104. In the 1955 
Idaho case of Cooper v. Westco Builders, 281 P. 2d 669, it 
was held to be error in a fraud action to deny the admissibility 
of a document which would only be pertinent to showing a 
course of conduct bearing on the issue of scienter and intent 
and would not be directly otherwise relevant to the transac-
tion in question. The Idaho Court then cites the general rule 
that much latitude should be allowed in the admission of evi-
dence tending to show fraud. 
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The Court committed further error when it refused ad-
mission of the SBA loan application after the subject had 
been introduced by the testimony of Mr. Peter Souvall 
R 31-37. The Bank has stated that Mr. Souvall's testimony 
went only to the existence and execution of the document 
and did not go into any of the particular thereof. On the con-
trary, the record clearly shows that Mr. Souvall testified in 
detail concerning the applicants, the identification and valua-
tion of much of the collateral of the loan, and to the fact that 
the proceeds were to be used for working capital R 31-37. 
Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to use the information con-
tained in the loan application for their purposes without 
subjecting themselves to the evidentiary liability of the pro-
posed exhibit. 
These errors are but further examples of the way Mr. 
Hunter was prevented from presenting his defense. Not only 
did the Court, in effect, tell the jury that the plaintiffs and 
the Bank were independent of one another, but it prevented 
the appellant from producing evidence that would show they 
were clearly motivated to work together to protect their 
mutual business interests and to conceal highly irregular 
and even illegal activities. Appellant was also prevented from 
showing how the individual plaintiffs and the individual Bank 
officers mutually benefited by their deception. These are 
legitimate areas of inquiry which certainly have relevance in 
this type of a case. Perhaps the attitude of the trial judge is 
best reflected by a statement he made after the voir dire of 
the jury, 
"I know that guy that said they didn't keep their 
records straight, Brother, I've never found the Bank 
was wrong yet. I have been wrong, but not the Bank." 
R 7 . 
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Proposed Exhibit 7-D and related testimony was material to 
numerous disputed facts and issues and the court committed 
substantial and prejudicial error by excluding it from evidence. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 17 AND 19 WHEN 
IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT LIA-
BILITY UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT CAN BE PREDICATED UPON AN OMISSION AS 
OPPOSED TO A MERE HALF-TRUTH. 
The Lower Court failed to properly instruct the jury that 
silence when one has the duty to speak is actionable under 
the cited statute. The Court only partially quoted the statute 
in Instruction No. 15 and then improperly interpreted the 
same in Instructions 17 and 19. In Instruction No. 15, the 
Court failed to cite the portion of the statute which refers to 
the liability of an agent for material misrepresentations and 
omissions. This was discussed fully in Point I. In Instruction 
No. 17, the Court improperly stated the elements of the stat-
ute which will be explained under Point IV of this brief. Sub-
section A that follows will show the Respondent's claim that, 
"the Court properly instructed the jury on omissions, when 
the instructions as a whole were considered'' is incorrect. Sub-
section B is a response to the Respondent's incorrect claim that 
the defendant-appellant does not claim that the Souvalls were 
guilty of any material omissions. 
A 
The Bank appears to have recognized the problems with 
Instruction No. 17, but states that the Court's instructions 
should not be judged by isolated statements contained in them, 
but must be considered as a whole. That being the case, we 
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next refer to Instruction No. 19 which is the other instruc-
tion interpreting the statute. Instruction No. 19 defines what 
is meant by material facts. The Court failed to explain how 
material facts may be either material misstatements or ma-
terial omissions, but rather defined them as: 
". . . Those fundamental, important facts concerning 
the financial condition of the corporation or particular 
reasons why such stock should be purchased." 
The clear inference of such language is that a material 
fact must be an affirmative statement about a material matter. 
In Instruction No. 19, the Court also stated, 
"Mere opinions or conclusions which do not incor-
porate material facts are considered to be sales talk, 
or irrelevant and immaterial to the part forming his 
opinion as to whether or not he should buy or sell the 
stock." 
In effect, the jury was told to disregard any representations 
which did not constitute material facts. However, the clear 
language of the statute states that if one makes such state-
ments which are misleading under the circumstances there is 
a duty to disclose all of the material facts about the securities 
in question. 
The case law referred to in both appellant's original 
brief and the Bank's brief supports the proposition that the 
construction of the language of the Federal Act which is com-
parable to the Utah statute, should not be technical and re-
strictive, but should be flexible to effectuate the remedial pur-
poses of the statute. See cases cited in appellant's and respond-
ent's brief under Point III and also SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195, 84 S.Ct. at 284. 
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In most of the cases referenced above, the fact situations 
were such that it was not really necessary to determine whether 
mere omissions, standing alone, were sufficient to support a 
finding of liability under the Federal statute. In any transac-
tion, it is almost always possible to find some representation 
which when considered in the light of the other circumstances 
of the case (including important omissions), would have to 
be considered misleading. It could be well argued that such 
is the case with the plaintiffs and the Bank in their dealings 
with Mr. Hunter. Certainly Mr. Souvall by implication made 
statements which, standing alone, were misleading. The very 
fact that he represented the stock was for sale infers that it 
has value when in fact it did not. His act of sending Mr. 
Hunter to the Bank to get information about the stock was 
misleading and Mr. Hunter had the right to rely upon the 
reasonable inference that he would get accurate and reliable 
information from the bank. 
B 
The Bank's representation in its brief that Mr. Hunter 
does not claim that the Souvalls made any omissions as to any 
material fact is not true. There are two major categories of 
Souvalls omissions claimed by the appellant. The first is that 
with which Souvall was charged by Law. The facts show that 
Mr. Peter Souvall was a Director of Universal Leasing when 
all of the financial statements were prepared on Universal 
Leasing and Universal Rockwell that could have been avail-
able to Mr. Hunter up through the time of sale R 118, 13P, 
14P, 18P, 23D. He is charged under the law with knowl-
edge of those statements. The three conflicting 8-31-69 state-
ments (13P, 14P, 18P) and the 11-30-69 statement (23D) 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were false, misleading, and did not represent the true finan-
cial condition of the Company as of their respective dates R 
268-270, 375-377 & 25P, 26P. A financial statement pur-
ports to reflect the status of the company on the books and 
records of the corporation. These statements didn't since the 
books of the company from 3-31-69 forward were not even 
posted until May, 1970 R 376. Those statements showed 
that the company was making money and had sufficient cur-
rent assets to meet their current liabilities. The books of the 
company, after posting, showed that they had lost $2,000.00 
by 8-31-69 and $34,000.00 by November and that their true 
net worth was not even 60% of the net worth shown on most 
of the false statements R 375, 377, Exhibit 3IP. The three 
8-31-69 statements (Exhibits 13P, 14P & 18P) were prepared 
for management (including Peter Souvall, a director at that 
time) because management knew that Universal Leasing was 
in dire trouble and they needed a financial statement to use 
in making an acquisition in hopes of bailing themselves out 
of the water R 604-605, 609-610. At least one of those 
false financials were subsequently delivered to Zions to ob-
tain additional financing R 606, 607. Hunter got 23D 
from Eames and 18P from the Bank and used them in con-
cluding that Universal Leasing was in good shape and prog-
ressing in a good manner R 397-398. 
The second area of omissions claimed against the Souv-
alls are those which put Souvall under a duty to speak. The 
plaintiffs had substantial adverse financial dealings and bus-
iness relationships with Universal Leasing which were not 
disclosed to the appellant. In November, 1969, Mark Eames 
(who was president of Universal Leasing and director of Din-
ner Table), attended a Dinner Table meeting at which Peter 
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Souvall and John Langeland were present. Eames presented 
a letter from Universal Leasing's Attorney to Dinner Table 
demanding the $50,000.00 that Dinner Table had taken from 
the working capital of Universal Leasing be returned to Uni-
versal Leasing R 672. Souvall said that $50,000.00 was 
paid back to Universal Leasing R 205. The facts show 
Universal Leasing requested its $50,000.00 back but Dinner 
Table was bankrupt R 684, 685. Therefore, instead of 
giving the money back, they gave Universal Leasing the rights 
to franchise Burger-in-The-Round which proved to be worth-
less R 684, 685. At that meeting, Langeland and Eames 
had a heated discussion in which John Langeland explained: 
(1) that Universal Leasing was not financially capable of 
handling any more of the leases that Dinner Table was gen-
erating; and (2) the current financial condition of Universal 
Leasing. Eames concluded from that discussion that Lange-
land appeared to have knowledge of the financial condition 
of Universal Leasing at that time R 672, 673. Universal 
Leasing was in serious financial trouble, because their cash 
position was short and the delinquency position of their ac-
counts receivable was very bad R 604-605, 609-610, 617. 
Subsequently, Eames was informed that plaintiffs were 
going to declare bankruptcy. He kept in constant contact 
with them trying to collect the sizable receivable they had 
with Universal Leasing R 618. When Eames was informed 
that Hunter might buy Souvalls' stock, he felt that if Hunter 
did, it would be to the betterment of Universal Leasing since 
Hunter's bailing the Souvalls out at Zions Bank would put the 
Souvalls in a position where they could possibly honor their 
obligations to Universal Leasing. Eames said, "That was 
the whole incentive behind the whole program" R. 618, 
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619. It was this incentive that caused the Board of Directors 
of Universal to remove the legend on Souvalls' stock (R 673) 
and for Eames not to disclose to Hunter the business and finan-
cial dealings of Dinner Table and Universal Leasing and the 
resultant adverse effects on the financial condition of Uni-
versal Leasing R 618-620. 
After Hunter purchased the stock, Eames was still mo-
tivated and resisted putting out any financial statements that 
would reflect the true condition of the Company R 365. 
Hunter threatened suit R 483. Finally in May, 1970, Uni-
versal Rockwell retained Robert Apgood for that purpose. He 
had to post the books from 3-31-69 forward R 375-377. 
He testified that the books showed that the leases that Dinner 
Table had with Universal Leasing were delinquent R 318-
319. Eames testified that those leases which were in de-
fault amounted to approximately $300,000.00 R. 619-
620. On one of these leases, he discovered that the 
equipment didn't exist R 683. By the end of May, Apgood 
had prepared a financial statement for their year end, which 
was March 31, 1970. The statement showed that Universal 
Rockwell had lost $126,000.00 and had $736,419.63 in cur-
rent liabilities and only $445,913.00 in current assets R 
548-549. Eames testified that the merger with North Star 
Marine Sales was rescinded because the working capital of 
Universal Rockwell had been depleted in Dinner Table and 
that put Universal Rockwell in a position where they could 
not make payments on any of the assets of North Star Marine 
Sales that were encumbered R 548, 361. The facts show 
that the plaintiffs not only knew Universal Rockwell was in 
serious financial trouble, they were the major factor that 
caused it. 
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Approximately one month before Mr. Hunter entered 
negotiations with the Souvalls and the Bank, they agreed to 
sell all of the items that Mr. Hunter purchased for $133,-
500.00 to Mr. Psarras for $35,000.00 R 100. This agree-
ment with Psarras for $35,000.00 included the shares of Uni-
versal Leasing stock R 100, 101. That sale to Psarras was 
being held up prior to the time Hunter entered the picture 
because Psarras needed a little time to come up with the 
$35,000.00 and when Souvall discussed the pending sale with 
the Bank and SBA, they told him that he needed to get a 
disclaimer from the Bankruptcy Court before the sale could 
be completed R 41-42, 59, 234-236. Therefore, when Mr. 
Hunter appeared on the scene inquiring about the Universal 
Leasing Stock, Souvall told Hunter that there were other assets 
for sale and that they had pending sales of those assets to 
Psarras and others R 47-48, 102. Hunter was told by 
Souvall and his attorney that the sale of the stock to him 
and the sale of other assets to others had to be combined in 
one sale to him to satisfy the Bank and allow the Bank to get 
a disclaimer from the Bankruptcy Court on the items that were 
to be purchased by Psarras (excluding the stock that he was 
getting) and the restaurant inventory R 109, 448, 454, 232, 
234-236, 243-245. The Souvalls informed Hunter that the 
price that had been agreed upon in the pending sale they 
had with Psarras was $35,000.00. They did not inform Hun-
ter that the sale they had pending with Psarras was to have 
included the Universal Leasing stock R 48-49. At the 
same meeting Hunter signed the 3-9-70 purchase contract (Ex-
hibit 3P), he signed another contract selling all the assets he 
purchased, except for a nominal amount of inventory and the 
stock, to Psarras for $35,000.00 R 101, 102, 103, 398-400, 
537. 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The very fact that the plaintiffs and the Bank were will-
ing to sell the stock and the other items to Mr. Psarras for 
$35,000.00 and then shortly thereafter sold essentially the 
same items to Mr. Psarras for $35,000.00 without the stock, 
indicates that they placed no value whatever on the stock. 
In addition to the omissions of the plaintiffs of not telling 
Hunter that they knew Universal Leasing was in serious finan-
cial trouble and the fact that they had financial dealings and 
relationships with Universal Leasing which could and did 
cause Universal Leasing to go broke, they were guilty of addi-
tional omissions that paved the way for Hunter's deception. 
The only two sources from which Hunter received in-
formation were Mark Eames and the Bank. The Souvalls 
omitted to tell Hunter that (1) the relationship they had 
with the Bank went far beyond that of creditor-debtor as dis-
cussed in Point II of this brief and (2) that the relationships 
they had with Universal Rockwell included a substantial 
creditor-debtor relationship. This allowed a situation to be 
created in which Hunter was getting information from sources 
which Hunter had no reason to believe might be biased. 
However, these sources in reality, had very strong motives to 
provide Hunter with false information and to conceal the true 
financial condition of the company from Hunter. 
The omissions of the plaintiffs combined with the omis-
sions of and false information given by the officers of the 
Bank and Universal Leasing, left Hunter with a picture that 
Universal Leasing was in good financial condition and its 
stock was a good buy. The effect and legal consequences of 
those omissions under the statute should have been considered 
by the jury. The jury was precluded from so doing by the 
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following errors of the Court: (1) The Court failed to prop-
erly construe the evidence which was presented; (2) The 
Court failed to instruct the jury on the agency relationship 
between the plaintiffs and Bank officers; (3) The Court re-
fused to allow the defendant to introduce additional material 
evidence on the question of agency and other relationships 
of the plaintiffs and Bank officers; (4) The Court failed to 
properly instruct the jury on the legal consequences of omis-
sions under the statute where there is a duty of speak; (5) 
The Court failed to properly instruct on what is required in 
the way of a statement to make those omissions a violation of 
the statute. Thus because of the court's improper rulings, 
neither the omissions of the plaintiffs or the Bank were con-
sidered by the jury as having any consequence. 
It has long been a principle at common law that silence 
may be actionable fraud under certain circumstances. As se-
curity transactions multiplied and as it became apparent that 
it was difficult to apply general common law fraud principles 
to those transactions, Congress and State Legislatures enacted 
liberal statutes to control security dealings. It would be a 
strange result indeed if construction of these statutes made it 
more difficult to enforce than even the common law. In the 
instant case, those important jury questions were never de-
cided because of the numerous errors of the court. Those 
errors amounted to substantial and prejudicial error. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY DEFENSE 
AND CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
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The respondent argued that there was no evidence pre-
sented to the Lower Court that tends to support a finding 
that the Bank was guilty of a violation of Section 61-1-22 
(1) (b) because the Bank was not aware of any material 
information relating to the financial condition of Universal 
Leasing other than that provided to the defendant-appellant. 
The respondent has apparently chosen to ignore the facts that 
were presented at the trial and also to ignore the effect of 
the Court's exclusionary rulings. The facts that showed the 
creation of the agency relationship were fully discussed under 
Point I and will not be repeated hereunder. The liability of 
the Bank results from acts which they committed as an agent 
for the sellers. These acts constituted both material misrepre-
sentations and material omissions. Not only do these acts 
attach directly to the Bank, but they also should be imputed 
to its principal, the plaintiffs, as a basis for liability on their 
part. The failure of the court to instruct on these points was 
prejudicial error. These acts and omissions of the Bank will 
be discussed under Subsection A and the errors in the instruc-
tions and interrogatories will be discussed under Subsection B. 
A 
The statute, would have required the Bank to sustain 
the burden of proof that it did not know, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not know, of the existence of the un-
truths or omissions claimed. The sole evidence presented to 
the lower court that would have gone towards sustaining that 
burden of proof were certain statements made by Langeland 
and Bennett of the Bank as discussed below. The facts re-
garding the creation of the agency relation were in dispute. 
The Souvalls told Hunter that their information on the stock 
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was at the Bank and sent Hunter there to get it R 396. 
Pete Sou vail called Bennett and told the Bank to give "Hun-
ter whatever information the Bank had" R 283. When 
Hunter arrived at the Bank, Bennett said that Hunter asked 
him for whatever financial information the Bank had on Uni-
versal Leasing R 160. The issue as to what information 
the Bank gave Hunter is a matter of heavy dispute and should 
have been presented to the jury under the guidelines of the 
statute. 
Bennett claims that he discussed two conflicting 8-31-69 
financial statements on Universal Leasing (13p & l4p) with 
Hunter and explained that the statements showed that Uni-
versal Leasing owned Universal Rockwell. He also discussed 
the difference in amounts in assets and that he didn't know 
which statement was correct R 160, 161, 162, 667. He 
said that was all he discussed because that was all Hunter 
was looking for R 667. He said that he was aware that 
Hunter asked for a financial statement but didn't recall 
whether he gave Hunter one or not R 153. Bennett testi-
fied that he told Hunter to audit the Company since the Bank 
was relying upon sources other than financial statements for 
their value R 162. He did not recall discussing Universal 
Leasing with Hunter thereafter R 184, 185. 
Langeland said that he was aware that Hunter had a fi-
nancial statement on Universal Leasing and that Hunter came 
into Langeland's office with the statement in his hand, and 
said to Langeland, "I know about the financial condition of 
Universal Leasing." When Langeland was asked what 
prompted Hunter to say that, Langeland said that he con-
cluded from his conversation with Hunter that "Hunter was 
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concerned at that time about the financial condition of the 
Company that was a small part of the overall Company in 
which he was buying stock" R 633, 634. He said that he 
told Hunter that "the Bank has no reason to have a financial 
statement that they had to rely on in their files on Universal 
Leasing" R 638, 639. He claimed that he further advised 
Hunter to check the books and records to make sure the finan-
cial statement was correct R 638, 639- Langeland said Hun-
ter returned two days later for a second meeting and told 
Langeland that he looked at the assets and the accounts of the 
Company and nothing was fundamentally wrong with the 
Company R 640. Langeland said that no one other than 
Hunter and himself were at those meetings R 637, 640. 
All of the above testimony of Langeland took place on the 
last day of the trial R 636-642. 
Langeland had testified earlier in the trial and in his de-
position that he did not have any meetings where he was 
alone with Hunter which contradicts the above testimony 
R 238, 239. He also testified that Hunter did not say any-
thing about the merger wtih North Star Marine Sales which 
is also not consistent with the above testimony R 639-640. 
Hunter claims that Bennett gave him one 8-31-69 finan-
cial statement on Universal Leasing (18p) and told him that 
was all the information they had and did not discuss 13p or 
l4p with him R 513. He also testified that neither Bennett 
nor Langeland gave him any other financial information on 
Universal Leasing and that the Bank officers did not advise 
him that the statement he received might be incorrect or that 
he should investigate it further R 507, 513, 550. 
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The claims by the two Bank officers and the claims by 
the defendant-appellant recited above represent the two sides 
of the issue as to what information was given to Hunter by 
the Bank. Those facts were in dispute and that issue would 
have been submitted to the jury to decide under the conditions 
prescribed by the statute. The Court failed to do so. The Court 
also failed to allow the jury to consider the legal consequences 
of the omissions of the Bank under either statutory or common 
law fraud. The claims of the Bank that "the Bank was not 
cognizant of any material information of the financial condi-
tion of Universal Leasing that they did not convey to Hunter" 
and "they answered all Hunter's questions about the stock" 
are not supported by the record p. 25 and 4 Bank's brief. 
Hunter asked the Bank for whatever financial information they 
had on Universal Leasing R 160. The only information 
that the Bank claimed to give Hunter was that which was 
discussed in the disputed facts above. 
The record shows that the Bank was aware of a great deal 
more material financial information on Universal Leasing 
than even that which they claimed to have discussed with him. 
Universal Leasing was a customer of the Bank when Hunter 
first approached the Bank to inquire about the Universal Leas-
ing stock. It had been a customer since prior to the summer 
of 1968. It had some loans outstanding and had applied for 
others when Hunter approached the Bank. R. 141-143, 195. 
Bennett was head of the credit department for the Bank. 
He testified that he requested the Spanish Fork Branch of the 
Bank to send him some financial statements on Universal 
Leasing as additional information on the financing that Uni-
versal Leasing was requesting R. 142, 195. He testified that 
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he was concerned about what the value of the stock might 
be outside of Swenson's offer and called Eames to inquire 
about the same R 162. He wrote a memo to himself about 
that conversation which stated that Eames told him that the 
8-31-69 financial statement sent up from Spanish Fork was in-
accurately prepared R 163, Ex. I6p. 
The value of the stock and the credit worthiness of Uni-
versal Leasing would have varied greatly, depending which, 
if either, of those financial statements were correct. Yet he did 
not ask Eames which 8-31-69 statement was correct and he 
was not concerned which, if either, was correct since he was 
relying on Swenson's offer for their source of value of the 
stock R 186. Bennett testified that he discussed two of the 
conflicting 8-31-69 statements with Langeland R 190. 
Langeland testified that Bennett did not discuss those two 
conflicting statements with him, but that he was aware that 
the Spanish Fork Branch of the Bank had sent up one financial 
statement of Universal Leasing R 229, 230, 643. He later 
contradicted this and testified that he was not aware of where 
Bennett got any financial statements on Universal Leasing and 
knew that his office did not have any financial statements on 
Universal Leasing R 639. 
The only way that the Bank would loan money to Uni-
versal Leasing was on the strength of the Lessee, not on the 
strength of Universal Leasing R 645, 646. The Bank officers 
had substantial involvement with the plaintiff corporations 
and those corporations had substantial adverse financial deal-
ings with Universal Leasing which were the major factors that 
caused them to go broke. See Point III of this Brief. The Bank 
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was aware that Universal Leasing was in serious financial 
trouble. They omitted to convey the important financial infor-
mation discussed above to Hunter. Those omissions amounted 
to a violation of the statute. There was sufficient evidence pre-
sented on this issue, but the court failed to submit it to the jury. 
B 
Even in the instructions which the Court did give, there 
were numerous errors which compounded the confusion in 
the jury. The following is an itemized discussion of these errors: 
1. In Instruction No. 6, the Court gave the standard 
instruction on burden of proof being by the preponderance of 
the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence was defined in 
Instruction No. 5. In a case of this type, where there are var-
ious standards for burden of proof depending on the issue 
being considered, it was error to give Instruction No. 6 since 
it tells the jury that whenever it considers burden of proof 
it should consider it as meaning proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
2. In Instruction No, 21, the Court gives an opposite 
general instruction to the effect that the jury is required to 
assume that all men are fair and honest in their dealings until 
the contrary is clearly and convincingly proven by the evi-
dence. Thus, we see the jury is given two general instructions 
on burden of proof, one being by a preponderance of the evi-
dnce and the other being by clear and convincing evidence. 
The jury possibly thought that Hunter had to prove anything 
relating to the Souvalls lack of fairness or honesty by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
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3. In Instruction No. 31, the jury is instructed that Mr. 
Hunter has the burden of proving his statutory defense against 
the plaintiffs. The clear language of the statute is that the only 
burden which Mr. Hunter has with regard thereto is to prove 
that he did not know the truth of the misstatement or omis-
sions claimed or in the exercise of reasonable care could not 
have known. He did this and the evidence to that effect was 
undisputed R 397-403. The statute placed a burden upon 
the Souvalls to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
they did not know or in the exercise of reasonable care, could 
not have known of the misstatement or omission claimed. The 
court did not require Souvall to meet that burden, instead they 
erroneously placed it on Hunter. Based on the evidence pre-
sented, Souvall would not have met the burden. This error 
alone would justify reversal or, at least, the granting of a new 
trial. 
4. Instruction No. 17 states that intention and scienter is 
an element of statutory fraud which is clearly not the case. 
This point has been fully discussed in appellant's original brief. 
5. Instruction No. 18, which is an instruction on the 
elements of common law fraud, completely overlooks the con-
sideration that silence, when one has a duty to speak, may be 
the basis of actionable fraud. 
6. Instruction No. 19 also fails to define the meaning 
of "misleading statements" and fails to show how they relate 
to "material facts" as defined in said instruction. It also fails 
to make clear that material facts may be either material repre-
sentations or material omissions. 
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The above errors were individually and collectively preju-
dicial to appellant's right to fair trial. 5 A CJ.S. Appeal and 
Error, Section 1763 (3) at page 1200 states as follows: 
"It is regarded as reversible error when the instruc-
tion places the burden on the wrong party, or places 
on the proper party a greater burden than the law 
requires, or fails to require the necessary degree of 
proof, or requires him to assume the burden of prov-
ing matters which he need not prove to establish his 
case or defense, or does not require him to carry the 
burden of proving all that is necessary." 
In addition to the above mentioned mistakes in the in-
structions and the others referred to in other parts of the brief, 
the Court's interrogatories were highly confusing and mis-
leading. The jury was not asked if the Bank made any material 
omissions either as it would apply to their statutory liability 
or the charge of common law fraud. There were no interroga-
tories on the question of agency and its varied ramifications 
upon the evidence as heretofore explained. In several of the 
interrogatories, there were multiple questions in one interroga-
tory which makes it difficult to know just what the jury was 
answering. Examples of these have been pointed out in ap-
pellant's original brief. Also, as pointed out in appellant's brief, 
there was no reason for the giving of Interrogatories Nos. 21, 
22, 23, 24 and 25. It is difficult to really know what the jury 
did decide in the case because of the confusion in the instruc-
tions and the interrogatories and because of the failure to 
allow the appellant to develop his case. The Bank has contend-
ed that the interrogatories and instructions are clear when 
viewed as a whole, but it is appellant's contention that they are 
even more confusing in their entirety than when read indi-
vidually. 
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The Court should have allowed appellant to amend his 
pleadings to conform to the evidence at the close of the case. 
It is recognized that as a general rule this is within the sound 
discretion of the Court, however, when viewed with the num-
erous other prejudicial errors of the Court, it can be seen as a 
definite abuse of discretion to not allow such an amendment. 
The Bank contends that it would not have been fair to subject 
them to the theory of statutory fraud since they had prepared 
only to meet the charge of common law fraud. The Bank can 
hardly claim to be surprised on this point, since the issues of 
statutory fraud were clearly part of the pleadings against plain-
tiffs and the pleadings did allege an agency relation between 
the plaintiffs and the Bank. If there was any such surprise, it 
can certainly be corrected by a new trial which is deemed neces-
sary because of the other numerous errors aforementioned. 
POINT V 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS FOR 
FRAUD AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND INTERVEN-
ING PLAINTIFF UPON THE BASIS THAT "NO PROOF 
OF GENERAL DAMAGES OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
WERE SHOWN." 
It was prejudicial error for the Court to dismiss appellant's 
counterclaims for fraud and the manner in which it was done 
seriously weakened appellant's affirmative defenses. The jury 
was advised at the outset that appellant was counterclaiming 
against both the Bank and the plaintiffs. When the Court 
dismissed the counterclaims without explaining to the jury 
the reason for the same, it is likely that the jury concluded 
that Mr. Hunter did not have valid claims for fraud either by 
way of counterclaim or by way of affirmative defense. Further, 
the Court merely struck out the word "counterclaim" in some 
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instructions, left it in in others, and told the jury that both 
counterclaims were dismissed. This must have made the jury 
feel that the Court concluded that Mr. Hunter's claims for 
fraud were not well founded. 
The reason given by the Court for dismissing Mr. Hunter's 
counterclaims was that that there was no proof of general or 
punitive damages shown. There was certainly evidence of 
damage as pointed out in appellant's original brief. To those 
statements, the Bank has responded with statements that are 
false and not supported anywhere in the record. There is abso-
lutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Hunter ever collected 
more than $9,000.00 on the sale of the Universal Rockwell 
stock which he transferred, Their brief p. 30. As a matter 
of fact, on many of the transactions, Mr. Hunter did not col-
lect, after he thought the stock was worthless, because it would 
have been a violation of law to do so. The Bank stated that 
Hunter was trying to sell stock in September even though he 
knew it was worthless, Their brief p. 7, 30. After he learned 
the true condition of Universal Leasing, the only time Mr. 
Hunter attempted to sell the stock was when he was approached 
by an individual in September of 1970 who said that he repre-
sented a group that was interested in purchasing a corporate 
shell. He quoted some terms to Hunter. Mr. Hunter advised 
him that the stock was worthless and that the corporation 
had some serious problems and the individual never contacted 
him again. R 485-495, 585. 
It is also false to say that he received a computer floor 
and air conditioner from Mark Eames in lieu of payment of 
$10,000.00. The facts are that Mr. Hunter did get possession 
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of said equipment and he had an oral agreement with Mr. 
Eames whereby Mr. Eames was to pay $10,000.00 to Mr. 
Hunter and give him said equipment for some of Mr. Hunter's 
stock in Universal Rockwell. Mr. Eames received the stock 
but would not pay the $10,000.00 unless Mr. Hunter signed 
leases on the equipment, which he refused to do. Therefore, 
that deal fell through and Mr. Hunter retained the equipment, 
although he had not yet received title to the same. Subse-
quently, the title was conveyed to him by Mr. Eames in return 
for Mr. Hunter conveying the balance of his shares in Uni-
versal Rockwell. At the time, Mr. Eames was attempting to 
get all of the shares of Universal Rockwell in order to sell the 
same as a corporate shell R 627-630, 580-582, 587. 
The statement by the Bank that Mr. Hunter sold the 
inventory he received and retained the funds derived therefrom 
is absolutely false, Their brief p. 30. So is the statement 
that "all Hunter ever paid on the contract was $9,000.00," 
Their brief p. 6. As a matter of fact, the evidence is entirely 
to the contrary. Mr. Hunter continually worked with Mr. 
Souvall and others to liquidate the collateral that could be sold 
and the proceeds from all of these sales went to the Bank. 
This amounted to approximately $44,252.69 R 71, 127 lOp 
400. One of those payments in the amount of $4,778.00 
was made prior to signing the note R 401, 402, Exhibit lOp. 
Hunter did not owe $133,500.00 at the time he signed the 
note and it was not signed to evidence his indebtedness R 401, 
402. It was signed to evidence the fact that he had taken 
the stock out of the Bank and his willingness to pay interest 
on the SBA loan R 401, 402, 132, 133. The only moti-
vation that Mr. Hunter can determine that the Bank has in 
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making such false and misleading statements concerning him 
is that they are continuing to attempt to cast him in a bad 
light while attempting to vindicate the actions of the plainiffs 
and the Bank officers. 
Mr. Hunter contends that the 5,188,000 shares of Uni-
versal Rockwell stock which he caused to be conveyed back to 
the Bank was a fair exchange for the 10,000 shares of Uni-
versal Leasing stock which the Bank released to him. The 
Bank has responded by saying this is not so since the Universal 
Leasing stock was to be free trading while the Universal Rock-
well stock which was conveyed back to the Bank was registered 
letter stock which could not be freely traded Their brief p 30. 
It is appellant's position that it doesn't really make much 
difference since the shares of stock he received from the Bank 
were worthless and the stock he returned to the Bank was at 
least that good. 
The bank has continually maintained that Mr. Hunter 
received the shares of stock from the Bank by fraud and mis-
representation. This is based upon the allegation that he told 
the Bank that he had New York Stock Exchange listed stock 
which he would sell and use the proceeds therefrom to pay cash 
for the Universal Leasing stock. There is conflicting testimony 
in the record on this point. At one point in the testimony of 
Mr. Peter Souvall, he said that Mr. Hunter told him, in a 
meeting with Donald Bennett and John Langeland also 
present, that he had New York listed stock. Later in Pete 
Souvall's testimony and in all other testimony about that 
meeting, they claimed that Hunter said it was New York stock 
R 64, 107, 130, 201, 252, 258. The Bank's statements on 
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Page 7 of its brief to the effect that Mr. Hunter admitted that 
he had no New York stock or other securities is absolutely 
false. Mr. Hunter was asked the question if he had any New 
York listed securities and he truthfully answered that he did 
not R 499- However, the New York stock which he planned 
to liquidate was not referred to as being listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, but rather as being traded in New York. 
There is a significant difference between stock listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and shares of stock traded in New 
York which are not listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
However, for reasons explained to the Bank, he did not liqui-
date them at the time R 65, 131. They could hardly have 
relied upon his liquidation of this stock at the time they 
delivered the Universal Leasing stock to him because he 
explained to them that he had not sold it. At any rate, in 
Interrogatory No. 9, the jury found that the plaintiffs and the 
Bank were not deceived by any such representations. 
It is also a fact that prior to the time of the transaction, 
Mr. Hunter personally had loans which totaled $25,000.00 
with the Bank and was serving as a guarantor for a third party 
who had a loan with the Bank R 201, 244. As part of these 
transactions, Mr. Hunter had securities pledged with the Bank 
and had given them financial information which gave them 
actual knowledge of the securities Mr. Hunter owned R 260. 
It is also a fact that early in the transaction, the Bank recom-
mended Mr. Hunter to the Souvalls as a man of character and 
honor and one who was financially capable of handling the 
transaction R 201, 244, 252-257, 259, 710. It is in-
credible that the Bank can now argue that they were not 
aware of Hunter's financial condition and were deceived by 
Mr. Hunter's alleged misrepresentation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because of the numerous errors set forth herein, defendent-
appellant is entitled to have this Court reverse the judgment 
of the Lower Court and direct entry of judgment for defendant-
appellant, or in the alternative, remand the case for a new 
trial with appropriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG &HANNI 
By 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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Respondent, 400 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this day of September, 1973. 
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